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suggestions. 1 Introduction
The high incidence of youth unemployment concerns the general public and many pol-
icy makers. It is not however unusual that youth experiences more unemployment at the
start of their professional career, since workers are typically searching for an adequate
job match in this phase of the career. This search process induces high job turnover,
possibly with intervening spells of unemployment. The high incidence of unemployment
for youth may therefore be only temporary. If so, youth unemployment would dissolve
automatically without any intervention, so that no speciﬁc measures for ﬁghting youth
unemployment are needed. Moreover, even if an unemployment experience leads to a
penalty in terms of employability or wages, this penalty could gradually fade away by a
“catch up” response induced by a higher intensity of on-the-job training for workers with
more past unemployment experience. Mroz and Savage (2006) indeed ﬁnd evidence for
such a catch up response for American youth. However, they also report that unemploy-
ment experienced as long ago as ten years continues to adversely affect earnings despite
the catch-up response. The existence of persistent earnings penalties of unemployment
experienced early in the career is conﬁrmed in other studies both in the U.S.1 and in Eu-
rope.2 There is therefore quite ﬁrm evidence that policies aiming at the prevention of
youth unemployment yield long-lasting effects which should be taken into account when
judging their merit.
What happens, however, if preventive policy does not succeed and youth becomes
long-term unemployed? Are there long-run costs associated to further delays in work
experience once one is already deprived of it for some time? Is further unemployment ex-
perience beyond a certain period of inactivity no longer harmful? This study investigates
these questions for youth in Belgium who remained more than nine months unemployed
after leaving school. More insight into this issue provides valuable information for the
design of curative policy for long-term unemployed youth, i.e. whether it remains urgent
to ﬁght unemployment.
We analyse an administrative panel of 14,660 youngsters who in 1998 were still un-
employed nine months after graduating from school and for whom the quarterly labor
market histories, including the gross monthly starting wages, could be constructed for up
to ﬁve years later until the end of 2002. We analyse these data by means of a multivariate
duration model explicitly allowing for lagged state and duration dependence to capture
the scarring effects of remaining unemployed and explicitly integrating the analysis of
wages within this framework.
1See e.g. Ellwood (1982) and Kletzer and Fairlie (2003).
2See e.g. Arulampalam (2001), Gregg (2001), Gregg and Tominey (2005), and Gartell (2009). Ackum
(1991)ﬁndsnosigniﬁcanteffectonearningsofSwedishyouth. Gregg(2001)reportsonlyminorpersistence
for women. Gangji and Plasman (2007) ﬁnd substantial scarring effects of unemployment incidence and
duration on prime aged workers in Belgium. However, they do not study the speciﬁc impacts on youth early
in the career.
1An advantage of this modeling approach is that it identiﬁes the sources of the scarring
effect of unemployment duration, if any. Unemployment duration can affect labor market
outcomes directly and indirectly. The direct effect is through negative duration depen-
dence in the transition from unemployment to employment or through its lagged impact
on the starting wage and on the subsequent employment stability. The indirect effect is
through the employment experience that is forgone, inﬂuencing thereby both the duration
of subsequent (un)employment spells and the wage of subsequent employment spells. In-
sight into these sources is not only important to formulate policy advice but also to shed
light on which of the competing theories on labor market dynamics, such as human cap-
ital or signaling, are relevant in explaining the labor market transitions of disadvantaged
youth at the start of their labor market career.
From a methodological point of view it is key to distinguish between true and spurious
lagged (un)employment duration dependence induced by the correlation with unobserved
individual propensities to remain (un)employed. This is further complicated by the fact
that the effect of lagged duration can only be identiﬁed for individuals for whom one
observes a transition to the subsequent labor market state of interest. This leads to the
so-called “sample selectivity problem” (Heckman, 1979). We explicitly control for selec-
tivity that is induced by time invariant unobserved factors.
A number of researchers have followed a similar methodology to study the effect of
unemployment insurance, i.e. the level and duration of beneﬁt receipt, on the duration
of subsequent employment spells3 or to analyse the effect of lagged state and duration
dependence on labor market transitions.4 A few researchers5 have integrated the effect on
wages within this framework, but assumed that wages are lognormally distributed con-
ditional on covariates. This research contributes to the literature by proposing a ﬂexible
estimator of the wage distribution and by modeling it as a function of piecewise constant
baseline hazards which are shifted proportionally by (un)observed explanatory variables.
Donald et al. (2000) proposed this approach to construct a ﬂexible estimator of wage dis-
tributions that are functions of a large number of observed covariates. We extend this
framework by allowing for dependence on unobserved covariates and by integrating it
within a model of multiple states and spells including lagged occurrence and duration
dependence.6
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3
presents the econometric model. The estimation results are reported and commented in
Section 4. Section 5 shows goodness-of-ﬁt statistics and simulations aimed at quantifying
the effect, in terms of employment stability, of delaying the ﬁrst employment experience
of one or two years. Section 6 concludes.
3Belzil (1995, 2001); Jurajda (2002); Tatsiramos (2009).
4Böheim and Taylor (2002); Doiron and Gørgens (2008); Cockx and Picchio (2011).
5Bratberg and Nilsen (2000); Gaure et al. (2008); McCall and Chi (2008).
6Arni et al. (2009) have used our framework to estimate the impact of beneﬁt sanctions on earnings.
22 The Data
The empirical analysis is conducted on administrative records gathered by the Crossroads
Bank for Social Security (CBSS).7 The CBSS merges data from the different Belgian
Social Insurance institutions and allows thereby to construct the quarterly labor market
history of all Belgian workers. The data include real gross quarterly earnings8 and the
fraction of a full time worked in the quarter. The analysis is based on the gross monthly
full-time equivalent (FTE) starting wage deﬁned as one third of the ratio of these two
variables as measured in the quarter right after a transition to employment.9
The sample retains all Belgian youth, aged between 18 and 25 years, who, in 1998,
were still unemployed nine months after graduation. In Belgium, after this “waiting pe-
riod” of nine months, school-leavers are entitled, without any time limit, to ﬂat rate un-
employment beneﬁts (UB) and, as a consequence, show up for the ﬁrst time in the ad-
ministrative records of the CBSS. This selection results in a sample of 8,433 women and
6,227 men. By sampling from a population of school-leavers the initial conditions prob-
lempresentindynamicmodelswithlaggedendogenousvariablesisdrasticallysimpliﬁed,
since nobody in the sample had any labor market experience prior to the sampling date.
Nevertheless, the fact that all sampled individuals have been unemployed for nine months
since graduation leads to a problem of left truncation. In Subsection 3.3 we discuss how
we deal with this complication.
The quarterly (un)employment history of these workers can be reconstructed for a
period of (maximum) ﬁve years, from the beginning of 1998 until the end of 2002. In the
analysis we distinguish between three mutually exclusive labor market states occupied
at the end of each quarter: unemployed as UB recipient (u), employed (not necessarily
by the same employer) (e), and an absorbing censoring state (a). This censoring state
is accessed if the individual leaves the labor force, enters a training program or self-
employment, returnstoschool, orissanctionedandlosestheUBeligibility.10 Thesestates
deﬁne four potential transitions: ue, ua, eu, and ea. The starting wage (w) is modelled
as an intermediate labor market state that is realized before the start of each employment
spell: it is as if the transition ue were decomposed in two intermediate transitions, uw and
we. Over the ﬁve years time window, (un)employment spells and starting wages can be
observed repeatedly for the same individual. For the sake of limiting the computational
complexity, we restrict the empirical analysis to maximum two realizations per individual.
Table 1 reports, by gender, descriptive statistics on the endogenous variables: unem-
ployment and employment durations, transitions from the origin states, the FTE monthly
7See http://www.ksz.fgov.be/en/international/home/index.html.
8Wages are deﬂated by the consumer price index of January 2001.
9To accommodate for measurement errors observations are exogenously right censored at the start of
the employment spell if the fraction of working time or the starting wage is contained in the ﬁrst or last
percentiles of the corresponding distributions.
10We model the exit to these states as absorbing to reduce computational complexity.
3Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Endogenous Variables by Gender
a. Men Origin state
1st unemployment 2nd unemployment 1st employment 2nd employment
spell spell spell spell
Observed spell duration (quarters)
Average per person 5.3(a) 3.1 6.5 5.2
Number of spells
Total 6,277 1,689 3,505 1,047
Right censored on December 31, 2002 333 200 934 366
Absorbing censoring state 2,291 397 848 212
Uncensored 3,653 1,092 1,723 469
Duration percentiles (quarters)
25th 5 1 2 1
50th 7 2 4 4
75th 10 4 11 8
FTE gross monthly starting wages (e)
Mean – – 1,256 1,286
Standard Deviation – – 261 254
Skewness 0.038 0.002
Kurtosis 5.253 4.715
Median – – 1,217 1,250
Entitled to high UB(b)
Fraction of spells 0 0.208 – –
b. Women Origin state
1st unemployment 2nd unemployment 1st employment 2nd employment
spell spell spell spell
Observed spell duration (quarters)
Average per person 5.8(a) 2.8 7.3 5.3
Number of spells
Total 8,433 2,012 3,983 1,229
Right censored on December 31, 2002 490 186 1,018 415
Absorbing censoring state 3,768 555 932 219
Uncensored 4,175 1,271 2,033 595
Duration percentiles (quarters)
25th 5 1 2 2
50th 7 2 4 4
75th 11 3 11 9
FTE gross monthly starting wages (e)
Mean – – 1,188 1,231
Standard Deviation – – 257 255
Skewness 0.487 0.571
Kurtosis – – 4.902 4.512
Median – – 1,150 1,217
Entitled to high UB(b)
Fraction of spells 0 0.156 – –
(a) When computing these ﬁgures, we do not count the elapsed unemployment duration (3 quarters) at the sampling date.
(b) One is entitled to a higher UB if employed for more than one year.
4wage at the beginning of the corresponding employment spell and the fraction of spells
entitled to a higher UB. The last mentioned variable is endogenous, since the entitlement
to higher UB depends on the duration of the previous employment spell and on the pre-
vious wage. If one is uninterruptedly employed for more than one year, then the UB is
no longer ﬂat rate but proportional (limited by a ﬂoor and a cap) to the wage earned in
the previous job. In the econometric analysis we take this into account by including an
indicator variable that is equal to one if the UB is high and zero otherwise. Since we
sample from a population of school-leavers, there is no one eligible to high UB in the ﬁrst
unemployment spell and only a minority in the second unemployment spell (21% for men
and 16% for women).
The median duration for the ﬁrst unemployment spell is much higher than the one
of the second unemployment spell, respectively 7 and 2 quarters, both for men and for
women. This is a consequence of the sample selection rule requiring school-leavers to be
unemployed 9 months before showing up for the ﬁrst time in the administrative records
of the CBSS. The median duration of the 1st and 2nd employment spells is one year for
both genders.
The average wage of the ﬁrst employment spell is about e1,256 for men and e1,188
for women. The wage at the beginning of the second employment spell is somewhat
higher, e1,286 for men and e1,231 for women. Compared to the Normal distribution the
wagedistributionsdisplayexcesskurtosisandespeciallythefemalewagedistributionsare
skewed to the right. In spite of a minimum wage legislation in Belgium, the distributions
do not exhibit a spike at the lower bound. There are several explanations for this. First,
in Belgium the national minimum wage is a lower bound for minimum wages bargained
at the sectoral level by type of worker (blue or white collar). This means that the national
minimum only applies for the minority of workers who are not covered by a sectoral
minimum. Second, the national minimum depends on the age of the worker and on job
tenure.11 Finally, the national minimum needs not to be satisﬁed at each instant, but only
on average within a year.12
Table 2 displays descriptive statistics of the covariates used in the econometric anal-
ysis. These can be decomposed into two groups: time-invariant covariates ﬁxed at the
sampling date and time-varying covariates changing every quarter. The ﬁrst four columns
comprise summary statistics computed for individuals entering an unemployment spell.
11The baseline national minimum concerns workers older than 21 years without any tenure. The min-
imum for younger workers falls gradually to 70% of the baseline for 16 year olds. The baseline is 2.75%
and 4% higher if tenure (beyond the age of 21) exceeds 6 and 12 months, respectively.
12This latter feature also complicates the comparison with the wage data we use in this analysis, since
our wage data do not comprise some sector and ﬁrm speciﬁc bonuses, like the end-of-year bonus, which are
included instead in the national minimum (Moulaert and Verly, 2006). As a rule of thumb, one therefore
should multiply the minimum wage by 0.875 to make the minimum wage comparable to our wage data. In
2000, the converted national minimum wage for an 18 year old worker attained 802e. In the sample 2.6%
of male and female starting wages are below this minimum.
5Table 2: Summary Statistics of Covariates by Gender
1st unemployment spell 1st employment spell and wage
Men Women Men Women
Mean S.Dev. Mean S.Dev. Mean S.Dev. Mean S.Dev.
Time-invariant covariates at sample entry
Age at sample entry 20.49 1.96 20.37 1.96 20.37 1.96 20.58 1.95
Kids [0;3) years old .032 .176 .100 .300 .030 .170 .056 .237
Nationality
Belgian .888 .315 .875 .331 .889 .314 .897 .304
Non-Belgian UE .053 .225 .054 .227 .057 .231 .056 .229
Non-UE .058 .234 .071 .256 .054 .226 .047 .212
Education
Primary or none .127 .333 .083 .276 .104 .306 .049 .217
Lower secondary .295 .456 .233 .423 .271 .445 .162 .368
Higher secondary .446 .497 .503 .504 .479 .499 .548 .498
Post secondary .132 .339 .180 .384 .145 .352 .241 .428
Region of residence
Flanders .167 .373 .218 .413 .168 .374 .238 .426
Brussels .129 .336 .120 .324 .123 .328 .108 .310
Wallonia .703 .457 .663 .473 .709 .454 .654 .476
Household position
Head .079 .270 .114 .317 .065 .247 .064 .246
Single .137 .344 .105 .307 .122 .327 .101 .301
Cohabitant .783 .412 .781 .414 .813 .390 .835 .371
Time-variant covariates at spell entry(a)
District unemployment rate .187 .069 .270 .087 .182 .067 .259 .089
Regional GDP growth .022 .009 .023 .010 .023 .013 .024 .013
Quarterly indicators
January-February-March .085 .279 .073 .260 .236 .424 .250 .433
April-May-June .655 .475 .695 .461 .161 .368 .168 .374
July-August-September .165 .371 .158 .365 .302 .459 .301 .459
October-November-Dec. .094 .292 .075 .263 .302 .459 .282 .282
(a) We report here ﬁgures at unemployment and employment spell entry, although the district unemployment
rate, the regional GDP variation, and quarterly indicators enter the speciﬁcation of unemployment and
employment hazard rates as a time-varying variable. They enter the speciﬁcation of the wage hazard rate
as a wage-constant variable, ﬁxed at the beginning of the corresponding employment event.
6The last four columns deal with summary statistics computed for individuals entering an
employment spell.
Age, presence in the household of kids younger than 3 years, nationality, education,
region of residence, and household position dummies are the time-invariant covariates.
At the moment of entry into the sample, individuals are about 20.5 years old. Since the
sample consists of long-term unemployed, sections of the population with high unem-
ployment risk are more represented than in the population as a whole: foreigners, low
educated and, since the unemployment rate in Flanders is much lower, those living in
Wallonia and Brussels. The high share of youth living in Wallonia is especially striking:
more than two thirds of the sample has the residence in Wallonia, whereas only one third
of the total Belgian population lives in this region. At the sampling date 10% of women
and 3% of men reside in households with children younger than 3 years old. This sug-
gests that family constraints induced by the presence of children younger than 3 years,
the age at which children in Belgium generally start going to kindergarten, inﬂuences the
employment probability more negatively for women than for men.
We distinguish between three types of household positions: head of household, sin-
gle, and cohabitant. A head of household lives together with children or adults with an
income below a certain threshold. One is a “cohabitant” if the income of at least one
other household member exceeds this threshold and a “single” if living alone. These cate-
gories determine, together with age, the level of the ﬂat rate UB to which the unemployed
school-leavers are entitled after the aforementioned waiting period of nine months.13 The
majority of the sampled individuals (78%) are cohabitants. This reﬂects their young age:
the majority still lives with their parents.
The transitions in and out of unemployment are likely to depend on local labor market
and business cycle conditions. In the time window under analysis, the real GDP growth
rate increased steadily from 1.9% in 1998 to 3.7% in 2000, but then dropped to 0.8%
in 2001 and to 1.4% in 2002. The unemployment rate responded with some delay. It
decreased from 9.3% at the start of the observation period to 6.6% in 2001. In 2002 it
increased again to 7.5%.14 We therefore include in the speciﬁcation of the transition rates
the district unemployment rate, the regional growth rate of GDP, and seasonal indicators
as quarterly time-varying explanatory variables. In the speciﬁcation of the wage hazard
rate, these variables are ﬁxed at the quarter of job acceptance. Since standard statistics
of the unemployment rate are not available at the local level, we rely on a non-standard
deﬁnition, i.e. the ratio of UB recipients to the population insured against the risk of
unemployment (thereby excluding civil servants). This explains why the reported unem-
ployment rates are much higher than those based on the standard ILO deﬁnition. At the
sampling date in 1998, the average district unemployment rate is respectively 18.7% for
13Because of collinearity with age and household type, the amount of UB cannot be included as a
separate regressor. In 2000, the monthly beneﬁt level ranged between 307e for cohabitants older than 18
and 790e for household heads.
14These ﬁgures are available in Internet at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
7men and 27% for women, compared to 7.7% and 11.6% according to the ILO deﬁnition.
The regional GDP growth rate is deﬁned as the rate of change of the regional GDP from
same quarter of the previous year. The average regional GDP growth at sampling date
and at the start of the ﬁrst employment spell is around 2% for both genders.
3 Econometric Modeling
To detect potential scarring effects of past unemployment experience on current labor
market outcomes, we model the labor market histories as transitions between unemploy-
ment and employment in which the occurrence of and duration in previous labor mar-
ket states affect transitions from the current state. The starting wage is modelled as an
intermediate labor market state between unemployment and employment. Rather than
imposing a log-normal wage distribution, we contribute to the literature by specifying a
ﬂexible form based on its characterization in terms of hazard rate. In Subsection 3.1 we
introduce notation and specify the econometric model. In order to account for selection
on unobservables, we allow for unobserved random effects that may be correlated be-
tween destination states of the modelled transitions. In subsection 3.2 we discuss how
this unobserved heterogeneity can be identiﬁed and disentangled from (lagged) duration
dependence. In subsection 3.3 the likelihood function is derived explicitly taking into ac-
count the time grouping of the labor market transitions in quarterly intervals and the left
truncation of unemployment duration at the sampling date.
3.1 The Econometric Model
At the start of the observation period, unemployment, u, is the common origin state.
There are two competing exit destinations from unemployment: employment, e, and an
absorbing censoring state, a, which can be roughly categorized as out-of-labor force. We
model it is as an absorbing state as to simplify the model and to focus on active workers.
If employment is entered, a FTE monthly starting wage w is observed. Employment can
also be left for two destinations: u and a. In a particular individual labor market history,
one can observe a sequence of starting wages w and spells in u and e. For the sake of
limiting the computational complexity, no more than two observations of this sequence
are modelled. The order of realization within this sequence is denoted by superscript
s = 1;2.
Letxdenotethevectorofobservedexplanatoryvariables15 andV  (Vue;Vua;Vw;Veu;
Vea) be a random vector of transition speciﬁc ﬁxed covariates that are unobserved to the
analyst. These may capture factors such as unobserved productivity or household income.
15In the empirical analysis we allow for strictly exogenous (external) time-varying covariates. Introduc-
ing this time dependence would make the notation cumbersome. Since it is not a key feature we ignore it in
the presentation of the econometric model.
8T s
ok denotes the latent duration in origin state o ending in destination state k. The ob-
served duration is the minimum of the latent durations. W s is the random accepted wage
of the sth employment spell. Finally, Ys  [T s
ue;T s
ua > T s
ue;W s;T s
eu;T s
ea > T s
eu] and
P(Zjx;V) denotes the (joint) conditional probability of a (vector of) random variable(s)
Z conditional on (x;V).
We make the following assumptions, where V i  (V1;:::;Vi 1;Vi+1;:::VI):
Assumption 1
8s;o 2 fu;eg;i 6= j:P(T s
oi;T s
oj > T s
oijx;V)=P(T s
ojjx;V)P(T s
oj > T s
oijx;V).
Assumption 2 P(Y2jx;V;y1) = P(Y2jx;V;t1
eu).
Assumption 3 8s;ok 2 fue;ua;eu;eag:T s
ok ? ? V okj(x;Vok);W s ? ? V wj(x;Vw).
Assumption 1 states that the latent durations are independent conditional on the observed
and unobserved covariates, i.e. that the competing risks are conditionally independent.
By assumption 2, conditional on (x;V), the second vector of endogenous variables Y2
depends on Y1 only through the ﬁrst realized employment duration t1
eu and not through
the ﬁrst unemployment duration t1
ue nor starting wage w1. The dependence on t1
eu cap-
tures the effect of general human capital accumulation or signaling on subsequent wages
and labor market transitions. The unemployment duration and the starting wage affect
subsequent labor market outcomes only indirectly through their effect on the subsequent
employment duration. Finally, Assumption 3 implies that Vok (Vw) captures the unob-
served determinants of T s
ok (W s).
With these assumptions the joint conditional probability density function evaluated at







































































where 2s denotes the Kronecker delta, which is equal to one if s = 2 and zero otherwise.
This represents the joint conditional probability if one observes two complete unemploy-
ment and employment spells. It is not difﬁcult to see how this probability should be mod-
iﬁed if an observation is incomplete either as a consequence of exogenous right censoring
or because the absorbing state a is entered.
If the conditional marginal distributions on the right-hand side of (1) are absolutely
continuous,16 then they can be completely characterized by the corresponding hazard
16In the data the durations are measured in quarters. However, as explained in Section 3.3, we charac-
terize their distribution as if they are generated by an underlying continuous time process.
9rates. We assume that the hazard rates have a Mixed Proportional Hazard (MPH) speci-
ﬁcation and that the unobserved factors are independently distributed from the observed
ones:
























































Assumption 5 V ? ? x
The different components of the hazards have the following interpretation:
• The hjk()’s and hw() are the baseline hazard functions, non-negative and common
to all the individuals. Note that they do not depend on s. The order s of an outcome
of interest is assumed to affect the hazard proportionally. This will become apparent
in the speciﬁcation of $r (for r 2 fue;ua;w;eu;eag) below.
• The jk(x)’s and w(x) are the non-negative systematic parts and functions of co-
variates. Note that by Assumption 5 we can only give this part a structural (be-
havioural) interpretation if there are no other unobserved factors which are corre-
lated with x. Otherwise, the observed variables just serve as control variables which
purge for these correlated unobserved factors (Wooldridge, 2005).
• w(ts
ue) and ek(ts
ue) are the lagged unemployment duration dependence, i.e. the
non-negative impact of unemployment duration ts
ue on the wage hazard rate and the




of the corresponding hazard function: s = 2 instead of s = 1. It is assumed that this
shifts the hazards proportionally. In addition, this shift is allowed to depend on the
duration of the ﬁrst employment spell.
• ek(ws) is non-negative and captures the impact of the starting wage ws on subse-
quent employment transition intensities.
• The Vjk’s are non-negative random variables reﬂecting the unobserved individual
determinants of the hazards.
Misspeciﬁcation of the baseline hazard functions and too strict parametric assumptions
are possible sources of bias. The baseline hazards are therefore assumed to be piecewise
constant. With regard to the wage hazard rate, the wage support is divided in q intervals
Ir = [wr 1;wr), where r = 1; ;q, w0 < w1 <  < wq, w0  w is equal to the
10minimum observed wage, and wq = 1. We ﬁx w1 to the 5% percentile and wq 1 to
the 95% percentile of the wage distribution. We choose the width of the wage baseline
segments by dividing the wage support between the 5th and the 95th percentiles of the
unconditional wage distributions in 20 equally spaced intervals.17 In this way segment
widths are as narrow as 40e and we obtain a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation of the monthly
wage distribution.
The systematic parts are speciﬁed in a standard way:
l(x) = exp(xl); for l 2 fue;ua;w;eu;eag:
We take the logarithm of the lagged dependent variables, so that the corresponding coef-







eu) r + UBh1fue;uag(r)!r
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for k 2 feu;eag and s = 1;2:
where 1fue;uag(r) denotes the indicator function, UBh is an indicator variable equal to
one if the level of UB is high, and exp(r) is the proportional shift of the hazards if
s = 2 rather than s = 1, referred to as occurrence dependence in the interpretation of
the empirical results below. As mentioned in Section 2, UBh is one if t1
eu > 4 and it can




did not end before – the wage hazard is more difﬁcult to interpret. The wage hazard eval-
uated at w is the probability density of earning a wage exactly equal to w, conditional on
earning at least w. Individual characteristics and past labor market history affect this prob-
ability and thereby the corresponding wage distribution. A direct implication of modeling
the wage distribution by means of a MPH speciﬁcation is that a change in the covariates
affect all the quantiles of the wage distribution in the same direction. To see this, consider


















 1 () is the inverse of the integrated wage baseline hazard Hs
w(). It can be
shown that, per each quantile q 2 [0;1], the partial derivative of the quantile function (5)
with respect to each variable has opposite sign to that of the corresponding parameter.
17This is somewhat arbitrary but derivation of an optimal rule for segment widths is beyond the scope of
this study.
11If, for example, w < 0, a marginal increase in the unemployment duration ts
ue shifts the
wage distribution in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance. By contrast, if w > 0,
the resulting distribution will be (ﬁrst order) stochastically dominated.
In the special case that the wage baseline function is constant over the wage sup-
port, wages are exponentially distributed. In this case the MPH speciﬁcation implies that
observed and unobserved characteristics affect the log expected wages additively. This re-
semblesthewayinwhichcovariatesaffectwageswhenthesearelog-normallydistributed.
However, as soon as one departs from a constant wage baseline hazard function, the ad-
ditive relation between covariates and log expected wages is lost and the MPH structure
shifts the log-integrated wage hazard function additively instead.
3.2 Identiﬁcation
For the sake of clarity, the discussion on model identiﬁcation starts from a simpler version
of model (2)–(4). First, we assume that we observe only one sequence of realizations per
individual of (un)employment transitions and wages, i.e. s = 1. Second, we assume that
x does not contain time-varying variables.
Honoré (1993) showed that, under the MPH assumption, exogenous regressor vari-
ation, and auxiliary assumptions on either the ﬁrst moment or on the tail behaviour of
the mixing distribution, the model components, including lagged duration dependence,
are non-parametrically identiﬁed in a single risk framework. Under similar assumptions,
Horny and Picchio (2010) extend Honoré’s (1993) proof to competing risks.
If multiple observations per individual are observed (Abbring and van den Berg,
2003a,b)and/orifexogenousinformationfromtime-varyingvariablesisexploited(Brinch,
2007; Gaure et al., 2008), the aforementioned identiﬁcation assumptions can be relaxed.
The time-variation of exogenous variables is used to identify the causal impacts of en-
dogenous variables also in dynamic discrete time panel data models (Bhargava, 1991;
Mroz and Savage, 2006). The restrictions across time periods on the parameters of time-
varying variables generate exclusion restrictions, as every lag of the exogenous time-
varying variable could have a separate impact on the current realization of an outcome
variable. Our model, in its most general speciﬁcation, encompasses multiple realizations
per individual of the outcome variables and we condition on strictly exogenous time-
varying covariates. We therefore argue that, on the basis of the existing literature, our
model is over-identiﬁed and the MPH assumption is not crucial for separating structural
components and unobserved heterogeneity.
The aforementioned identiﬁcation results are derived in a continuous time framework.
By contrast, in our data the information on duration is grouped on a quarterly basis. As
shown in Ridder (1990), non-parametric identiﬁcation with discrete duration data requires
more structure on the systematic parts of the unemployment and employment transition
intensities, like a parametric structure l(x) = exp(xl) which takes on every value in
<+. However, Gaure et al. (2007) report from an extensive Monte Carlo analysis that,
12in practice, despite the time grouping of duration the true structural parameters can still
be robustly recovered from the observed data, to the extent that the discreteness of data
measurement is explicitly taken into account when setting up the likelihood function.
3.3 Likelihood Function
We only observe the labor market state occupied at the end of each quarter. The observed
duration data are therefore measured in discrete time. As mentioned in Subsection 3.2, we
explicitly take this discreteness into account. To avoid that the parameters depend on the
time unit of observation (Flinn and Heckman, 1982), we follow van den Berg and van der
Klaauw (2001) and specify the discrete-time process as if it was generated by a grouped
continuous-time model.
The likelihood contribution for individual i with a complete unemployment duration
spell s ending in k 2 fe;ag after t quarters and condtional on the unobserved heterogene-




















uk(   1jx;Vue;Vua)],  2 N, is the
survivor function in unemployment.19
• u is the set of unknown parameters in this likelihood contribution.
The conditional likelihood contribution of an incomplete unemployment spell is the sur-
vivor function in unemployment at the end of the observation period. The conditional
likelihood contribution of employment spells has the same structure.
The conditional likelihood contribution of the sth starting wage w is equal to the wage
density. If w 2 [wr 1;wr) and the baseline hazard of wages is piecewise constant, this

























18See Appendix A.1 for a more detailed derivation of this likelihood contribution.
19Note that the survivor function is the likelihood contribution for a spell that is exogenously right
censored at the end of the observation period (December 2002).
13Individual i’s conditional likelihood contribution is the product of all the individual
i’s single spell contributions. Denote this by Lm
i  Li(V;), where   (u;w;e)
is the set of parameters to be estimated. Since this likelihood contribution is conditional
on the unobserved factors V, we need to integrate them out.
Given that the model is non-parametrically identiﬁed, we follow Heckman and Singer
(1984) by assuming that the heterogeneity distribution can be estimated by a discrete
distribution function with a ﬁnite and, a priori, unknown number M points of support.20
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with m = 1;:::;M and M = 0:




As all sampled individuals have been unemployed for nine months since graduation, a
left truncation problem arises. We take this into account by following the conditional like-
lihood approach proposed by Ridder (1984). If the probability of becoming unemployed
after graduation is proportional in observed and unobserved explanatory variables, the in-
dividual contribution to the likelihood function just needs to be divided by the probability










We exploit information from multiple realizations per individual of unemployment dura-
tions and transitions to identify the survivor function in the denominator of (7). Gaure
et al. (2007) show that this approach works quite well in removing from the parameter
estimates the bias generated by the left truncation.
4 Estimation Results and Interpretation
The central question of this research is whether, for a population of long-term unem-
ployed school-leavers, remaining unemployed rather than employed inﬂicts a scar on the
future labor market career. To answer this question we ﬁrst focus our discussion on the
20On the basis of Monte Carlo simulations Gaure et al. (2007) ﬁnd that for datasets of size similar to the
one used here the number points of support is best chosen by minimizing the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC). We follow this recommendation.
14effect of elapsed unemployment duration on the transition rate from unemployment to
employment and on the impact of lagged unemployment duration on the transition rate
from employment back to unemployment. As an indirect cost of remaining unemployed
might be the employment experience that is forgone, a second point of discussion is the
extent to which the occurrence and duration of employment affect the subsequent starting
wage and the subsequent labor market transitions in and out of employment. Finally, if
lagged (un)employment experience affects the starting wage and the starting wage in turn
affects the duration of employment, the indirect effect through the starting wage should
also be taken into account. In order to get a quantiﬁcation of these effects, we report in
Section 5 the results of simulation exercises.
The quality of employment may decrease with unemployment duration for three main
reasons. First, the longer one remains unemployed, the more general and speciﬁc human
capital may be lost either directly through depreciation or indirectly by foregoing on-
the-job training (Pissarides, 1992; Mroz and Savage, 2006). Second, potential employers
may interpret a longer spell of inactivity as a negative signal of unobserved productivity
(Vishwanath, 1989; Lockwood, 1991). However, if the true productivity is revealed dur-
ing the employment relationship (Jovanovic, 1979), the negative impact on quality might
not be long-lasting. Third, the negative duration dependence in the transition from un-
employment to employment may rather reﬂect discouragement or the gradual drying up
of informal search channels (Calvo-Armengol and Jackson, 2004; van den Berg and van
der Klaauw, 2006). The latter may have long lasting detrimental effects to the extent
that ﬁnding a job through informal referrals may positively affect the job match quality
(Simon and Warner, 1992; Ioannides and Loury, 2004).21
In the literature (e.g. Arulampalam, 2001) it is argued that longer spells of unemploy-
ment do not necessarily penalize subsequent labor market careers. Unemployment may
be productive in enabling the individual to ﬁnd a job which better matches his/her skills
and preferences. This argument holds if one contrasts individuals with a different entitle-
ment duration to UB. Job search theory indeed predicts that a longer entitlement to UB
increases the reservation wage and therefore job quality (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976;
Card et al., 2007). However, a long-term unemployed worker is more likely to be liquid-
ity constrained than a short-term unemployed worker, since savings and UB decline or
expire. This lowers the reservation wage and, consequently, the quality of the subsequent
employment.
In this study we contrast youth who, conditional on their household type, are all en-
titled, without any time limit, to the same constant ﬂat rate UB.22 Differential liquidity
constraints are therefore not a source of variation of unemployment duration and cannot
21More recently, Loury (2006) and Bentolila et al. (2010) have questioned this positive effect.
22If the ﬁrst employment spell lasts more than one year, the level of UB is higher than in the ﬁrst
unemployment spell. However, we explicitly control for this by including an indicator variable equal to one
if beneﬁts are high and zero otherwise.
15explain the effects of unemployment duration on the labor market outcomes.23
The results reported for men are based on a model that allows for selective entry
in the absorbing state, while for women exits to the censoring state are assumed to be
independent from unobservables, since a log-likelihood ratio test cannot reject the null
hypothesis of equality of the unobserved location points (vm
ua and vm
ea) in the transition
rate to the absorbing censoring state (p-value equal to 0.572).24 The discrete unobserved
heterogeneity distribution has 3 probability mass points for both men and women.
In the main text we focus our discussion on the main variables of interest: the lagged
endogenous variables. The complete estimation results can be found in Appendix A.2.
These ﬁndings are in line with expectations and are therefore not further discussed.
4.1 The Direct Impact of Unemployment Duration
The top panel of Figure 1 display the baseline transition intensities from unemployment to
employment as a function of elapsed duration. Table 3 reports the impacts of lagged un-
employment duration on the starting wage and on the transition from employment to un-
employment. For both genders, the baseline transition intensity to employment is clearly
decreasing with elapsed unemployment duration, but the wage is not signiﬁcantly affected
by lagged unemployment duration. Lagged unemployment duration decreases the transi-
tion from employment to unemployment, but only signiﬁcantly for men.
How can this evidence be matched to the theory? A decreasing transition rate with
elapsed duration is compatible with both human capital depreciation (Pissarides, 1992)
and negative signaling (Vishwanath, 1989; Lockwood, 1991). However, lagged unem-
ployment duration does not signiﬁcantly affect wages and the effect on employment dura-
tion is positive. These ﬁndings are not consistent with human capital depreciation: human
capital depreciation implies a decrease of productivity with unemployment duration and,
hence, a lower wage and a higher separation rate from employment. For similar reasons
they are neither consistent with the drying up of informal search channels.
In contrast, the estimation results can be in agreement with signaling theory. At re-
cruitment, a worker is hired at a wage and terms that are in accordance with the produc-
tivity signal, among which the elapsed unemployment duration, available to the employer
at that moment. During the initial employment phase the employer learns about the true
productivity of the worker (Jovanovic, 1979). If at a certain point the employer realizes
that the true productivity is lower than expected on the basis of the signal at recruitment,
among which unemployment duration, she will ﬁre the worker. In contrast, if the true pro-
ductivity is higher than expected, the employer has incentives to retain the worker, since
23Since the level of UB for most school-leavers is low, the liquidity constraint may still bind after a
certain unemployment duration if their or their parents’ savings (the analysis concerns youth) run out. In
that case, we would however expect that such school-leavers accept employment of lower quality, of which
we ﬁnd no evidence.












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































17Figure 1: Baseline Transitions Intensities to Employment and Unemployment
she has been hired under favourable terms from the employer perspective. This implies
that a worker who had a shorter (longer) unemployment duration than expected on the ba-
sis of her true productivity will be ﬁred (retained). Consequently, if we take out that part
of the variation in unemployment duration at recruitment that is related to true productiv-
ity of a worker, which we do by conditioning on both observed and unobserved factors,
the remaining variation in unemployment duration should be, as we observe, negatively
related to the probability of dismissal.
Ifunemploymentdurationalsopartlyreﬂectshumancapitaldepreciation, thisnegative
relation with the probability of dismissal could disappear, since unemployment duration
would then also reﬂect a genuine lower productivity. Such a depreciation is more likely to
be the dominating factor for individuals with a certain work experience. On the one hand,
for a recruiter past labor market experience may be a more reliable signal of productivity
than unemployment experience.25 On the other hand, unemployed experienced workers
can incur in the depreciation of job-related human capital in addition to the depreciation
of the learning skills acquired at school. This could explain why Böheim and Taylor
(2002) ﬁnd a positive relation between lagged unemployment duration and tenure for a
representative sample of the working age population in the UK. In a model with a similar
structure as in this paper, but which assumes that wages, unemployment durations, and
25McCormick (1990) suggests that ﬁrms use type of job held as an indicator of future productivity.
18employment durations are log-normally distributed, Bratberg and Nilsen (2000) ﬁnd, in
line with our study, that unemployment duration signiﬁcantly increases the duration of
subsequent employment for school-leavers in Norway.
This positive relation between unemployment and employment duration may be brea-
ched in the presence of employment protection. Firing costs could make it too costly
to dismiss a worker whose productivity is lower than expected at recruitment. Again
this is less of an issue for school-leaving youth, since they are often hired in temporary
jobs. Moreover, in Belgium employment protection in open-ended contracts is very weak
during the ﬁrst 6 months. For white collar workers there is a trial period of up to 6
months during which the employer can end the contract without any cost if notiﬁed 7
daysinadvance. Forbluecollarworkersthetrialperiodlasts only 7days, butemployment
protection for these workers is much weaker than for conﬁrmed white collar workers.
Finally, if unemployment duration is a signal of productivity, why does not it nega-
tively affect the starting wage? We argue that this is a consequence of both the presence
of (sectoral) minimum wages in Belgium and the low level of beneﬁts to which the youth
in our sample is entitled. From Table 2 one can deduce that 78% of the sample is cohabi-
tant for whom the UB level is merely e307 (in 2000), while the national minimum wage
for an 18 year old was e802. It is therefore most likely that the vast majority of these
youngsters set their reservation wage at so low a level that they will not reject any job
offer irrespective of their unemployment duration. Other studies focusing on youth ﬁnd
similar results (Ackum, 1991; Bratberg and Nilsen, 2000).
4.2 The Indirect Impact via Forgone Work Experience
By remaining unemployed a worker might forgo the long-term beneﬁts of work experi-
ence, both in terms of occurrence and duration. First, consistent with the standard hypoth-
esis of accumulation of general human capital through on-the-job training (Ben-Porath,
1967; Blinder and Weiss, 1976; Mroz and Savage, 2006), we ﬁnd that employment expe-
rience signiﬁcantly increases the starting wage of both genders at roughly the same rate.26
On the basis of simulations we ﬁnd that: i) increasing the lagged employment duration by
10% signiﬁcantly increases the starting wage by 0.20% for men and 0.21% for women; ii)
a one year increase in the lagged employment duration signiﬁcantly increases the starting
wage by 2.3% for men and 2.5% for women.
Standard human capital theory predicts that past employment experience may not only
increase the wage, but also the duration of subsequent employment spells. We indeed
ﬁnd for women that increasing the duration of the previous employment spell by 10%
decreases the likelihood of being dismissed by 1.6%.27 We do not observe any signiﬁcant
26Recall that a negative impact on the wage hazard corresponds to a positive impact on the average wage
and on all quantiles of the wage distribution.
27(1   exp( :177))=10 = :016.
19effect for men, but this may be related to a multicollinearity problem: even if neither the
occurrence nor the duration of past employment has separately any signiﬁcant effect on
the dismissal rate, they are jointly signiﬁcant (p-value equal to 0.029).
Another standard ﬁnding (Topel and Ward, 1992; Farber, 1999) is that the dismissal
probability decreases sharply with elapsed employment duration (see the bottom panel of
Figure 1). The spike after 4 quarters observed for women might reﬂect the non-renewal
of temporary contracts.
Finally, past employment experience, irrespective of its duration, affects the job ﬁnd-
ing rate for women but not for men. For women, the job ﬁnding rate after the employ-
ment experience (i.e. during the second unemployment spell) is 34.2%28 higher that the
job ﬁnding rate during the ﬁrst unemployment spell. Apparently, it is more important for
women than for men to signal that they are really interested in working rather than taking
up responsibilities in the household.
To our knowledge only Doiron and Gørgens (2008) have studied the impact of past
employment experience on labor market transitions of youth. In contrast to our study,
these authors did not ﬁnd any evidence for dependence of labor market transitions on past
employment experience.
4.3 The Impact of the Starting Wage on the Transition from Employ-
ment
There is some consensus in theoretical models that higher wages induce longer lasting job
relationships. According to on-the-job search models (see e.g., Burdett, 1978; Mortensen,
1986), employee’s probability of voluntarily quitting the ongoing job decreases with the
wage, since optimal job search effort and the probability of ﬁnding a higher-paid job de-
cline with the actual wage. Furthermore, if the wage is considered as an incentive device
(Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984), high-wage employees have stronger incentives in exerting
higher effort and lower chances of being detected shirking than those of comparable low-
wage workers.29 High-wage workers’ probability of being laid off (their job tenure and
hence employment duration) is thereby expected to be lower (longer) than that of compa-
rable low-wage workers.
On the other hand, in the framework à la Jovanovic (1979), where the productivity of
a particular worker-ﬁrm match is not observable ex-ante but is revealed ex-post, if the true
productivity is revealed to be lower than expected, the starting wage is too high relative to
the true productivity. To the extent that the wage is downward rigid, e.g. because youth
is hired at the sectoral minimum wage, the probability of dismissal increases. Therefore,
conditional on their true productivity, as captured by the observed and unobserved indi-
28exp(0:294)   1 = 0:342.
29The positive relationship between the wage and effort has been assessed by Cappelli and Chauvin
(1991), Drago and Heywood (1992), and Fehr and Falk (1999).
20vidual characteristics, high-wage workers face a higher probability of being laid off than
comparable low-wage workers.
Consistent with the ﬁndings of Bratberg and Nilsen (2000) for Norwegian school-
leavers, our ﬁndings indicate that the ﬁrst mentioned theoretical prediction dominates. A
10% increase in the wage reduces the transition rate from employment to unemployment
by 1.4% and from employment to out of the labor force by 3.7% for men. However,
only the latter is signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 5% level. For women these ef-
fects are 2.3% and 0.6%, of which only the ﬁrst one is signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
ﬁnding that the wage affects transition from employment to unemployment less for men
than for women suggests that Jovanovic’s (1979) explanation is more important for men
than for women. This is in line with the ﬁnding reported in Subsection 4.1 that lagged
unemployment duration decreases the likelihood of dismissal only signiﬁcantly for men.
Finally, observe that the net positive effect of the wage on employment duration im-
poses an additional indirect scarring effect of unemployment duration on the labor market
career, since the foregone labor market experience negatively affects the starting wage
which in turn shortens the subsequent employment spell.
5 Simulations
From the estimation results reported in the previous section, we cannot conclude that stay-
ing unemployed unambiguously inﬂicts a scar on long-term unemployed school-leavers.
In this section we therefore present the results of simulations that aim at identifying which
of the opposing effects dominate and at deducing policy conclusions from this research.
To this end, we ﬁrst assess by simulations the goodness-of-ﬁt of the estimated model.
5.1 Goodness-of-Fit
To construct goodness-of-ﬁt statistics of the model, we simulate 999 labor market histo-
ries for each individual in the sample. By drawing each time from the assumed Normal
distribution of parameter estimates, we construct 95% conﬁdence intervals of the em-
pirical distributions of unemployment and employment duration, and of starting wages
that reﬂect both the parameter uncertainty and the uncertainty inherent in the outcome
variable of interest. The goodness-of-ﬁt can easily be checked by verifying whether the
observed frequencies lie within these conﬁdence intervals. In Appendix A.3 we list the
steps involved in the simulation procedure.
Table 4 contrasts the actual unemployment duration, starting wage, and employment
duration frequencies with the simulated counterparts and reports simulated conﬁdence
intervals. The model ﬁts the wage and employment duration very well, but there is a
tendency to overpredict the frequency of short unemployment spells while long unem-
ployment spells are somewhat underpredicted.
21Table 4: Goodness-of-Fit
Men Women
Actual Simulated 95% conﬁdence Actual Simulated 95% conﬁdence
frequencies frequencies interval frequencies frequencies interval
Quarters Unemployment duration distribution
1 .080 .100 .087 .114 .080 .102 .091 .112
2 .040 .042 .036 .049 .040 .041 .035 .046
3 .029 .027 .022 .033 .027 .026 .022 .031
4 .127 .161 .143 .180 .116 .141 .129 .153
5 .178 .198 .182 .214 .169 .192 .179 .205
6 .119 .116 .105 .129 .115 .111 .101 .121
7 .079 .082 .072 .092 .082 .084 .075 .093
8-9 .119 .114 .103 .126 .117 .118 .108 .128
10-12 .099 .087 .076 .097 .101 .092 .084 .101
13-16 .065 .054 .046 .061 .066 .059 .053 .066
17-23 .064 .019 .016 .024 .089 .034 .029 .039
Percentiles (e) Wage distribution
5 950 918 917 950 883 851 850 883
10 1,017 988 983 1,017 917 917 917 917
15 1,050 1,045 1,017 1,050 983 957 950 983
20 1,083 1,080 1,050 1,083 1,017 993 983 1,017
25 1,117 1,108 1,083 1,117 1,050 1,021 1,017 1,050
30 1,150 1,119 1,117 1,150 1,050 1,050 1,050 1,050
35 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,150 1,083 1,083 1,050 1,083
40 1,183 1,181 1,150 1,183 1,117 1,114 1,083 1,117
45 1,217 1,208 1,183 1,217 1,150 1,134 1,117 1,150
50 1,250 1,231 1,217 1,250 1,183 1,155 1,150 1,183
55 1,250 1,256 1,250 1,283 1,183 1,184 1,183 1,217
60 1,283 1,291 1,283 1,317 1,217 1,217 1,183 1,250
65 1,317 1,329 1,317 1,350 1,250 1,251 1,217 1,283
70 1,383 1,373 1,350 1,383 1,283 1,289 1,250 1,317
75 1,417 1,412 1,383 1,417 1,317 1,336 1,317 1,350
80 1,450 1,450 1,417 1,483 1,383 1,382 1,350 1,417
85 1,483 1,502 1,483 1,550 1,417 1,452 1,417 1,483
90 1,583 1,606 1,583 1,650 1,517 1,564 1,517 1,617
95 1,717 1,749 1,717 1,783 1,683 1,719 1,683 1,783
Quarters Employment duration distribution
1 .243 .218 .196 .244 .257 .245 .227 .265
2 .141 .130 .116 .146 .122 .120 .107 .134
3 .090 .086 .075 .098 .082 .080 .070 .090
4 .074 .072 .062 .083 .087 .086 .075 .096
5-6 .077 .075 .064 .085 .086 .086 .076 .097
7-9 .101 .098 .087 .110 .091 .092 .082 .104
10-18 .274 .321 .280 .360 .276 .292 .270 .314
Note: Actual frequencies lying in the 95% conﬁdence intervals of the simulated frequencies are in bold.
225.2 TheImpactofUnemploymentDurationontheJobFindingProb-
ability
The top panel of Figure 1 clearly displays that for both genders the baseline transition
intensity from unemployment to employment is decreasing with unemployment duration.
The ﬁrst simulation exercise is aimed at quantifying the impact of this negative duration
dependence on the cumulative job ﬁnding probability. We contrast three different coun-
terfactuals. In the ﬁrst one, the benchmark, we select all sampled youths. These youths
have an elapsed unemployment duration of three quarters at that moment. In the second
and in the third scenarios, we forced these youths to remain unemployed for, respectively,
one and two additional years, so that at the start of the simulation of their labor market
history they have been unemployed during, respectively, 7 and 11 quarters. Under these
3 different scenarios, we simulate transition intensities from unemployment and we com-
pute the cumulative job ﬁnding probability within q quarters, with q = 1;:::;12, counting
from the moment at which individuals are no longer in forced unemployment. In order
to focus on the effect of elapsed unemployment duration, we ﬁx in this and subsequent
simulations the time-varying variables to their time-average over the observation period.
Figure 2: Probability of Finding a Job in q Quarters by Gender
Notes: The grey areas are Monte Carlo 95% conﬁdence intervals, computed by 999 replications.
Figure 2 displays the evolution of the cumulative job ﬁnding probability in the three
23scenarios. It demonstrates that the negative duration dependence in the hazard to employ-
ment remains very important despite that in the benchmark simulation the selected youth
have already been unemployed for 3 quarters. For example, the probability of ﬁnding
a job within two years decreases from 60% (47%) in the benchmark to 16% (13%) if
the sampled men (women) had been unemployed for 7 quarters at the sampling date. If
youths are forced to be unemployed for 11 quarters at the sampling date, the job ﬁnding
probability within two years drops further to 7% for men and 5% for women.
5.3 The Impact of Unemployment Duration on Employment Stabil-
ity
In Section 4.1 (Table 3) we reported that a prolonged unemployment spell may be com-
pensated by a lower separation rate in the subsequent employment spell. Here we evaluate
whether this compensation can eliminate the negative impact of unemployment duration
on the job ﬁnding rate by quantifying the impact of lagged unemployment duration on the
survivor rate in employment.
We contrast again three different counterfactuals. In the ﬁrst one, youths are forced
into employment at the sampling date, i.e. after 3 quarters in unemployment. In the
second and in the third scenarios, they are all assigned a job after a forced sojourn of 4
and 8 more quarters into unemployment, respectively. Under these 3 different scenarios,
we simulate starting wages and employment durations and we compute the corresponding
survivor probabilities in employment.
Figure 3 displays these survivor probabilities. For men, the probability of surviving
in employment for two years is 32% if a job is entered at the sampling date, while it sig-
niﬁcantly increases to 36% (37%) if the lagged unemployment duration is 4 (8) quarters
longer.30 For women, the probability of surviving in employment for two years increases
not signiﬁcantly from 31% to 32% (33%) if a job is entered 4 (8) quarters after the sam-
pling date rather than at the sampling date. Even if for men a longer unemployment
duration has a signiﬁcant and positive impact on the employment survivor probability, the
size of the effect is small, especially compared to the size of the effects reported in the
previous subsection.
We therefore conclude that even for long-term unemployed youth it remains urgent
to ﬁnd employment as quickly as possible, since otherwise they risk to get stuck in un-
employment. This conclusion is reinforced if we take into account the indirect effect of
unemployment experience via foregone work experience on employment duration and on
the wage in particular, as discussed in Subsection 4.2.
30The impact on the employment survivor function due to an increase in unemployment duration of 4
and 8 quarters is different from zero at the 1% signiﬁcance level all along the survivor function.
24Figure 3: Probability of Surviving in Employment by Gender
6 Conclusions
This research focused on Belgian long-term youth who remained more than nine months
in unemployment after leaving school. In Belgium, school-leavers who are still unem-
ployed nine months after graduation are entitled, without any time limit, to ﬂat rate UB.
We studied whether further unemployment experience beyond this inactivity period is
harmful in terms of subsequent labor market outcomes.
We found that the job ﬁnding probability exhibits important negative duration de-
pendence even after controlling for ﬁxed observed and unobserved characteristics. For
example, if the job-market entry is further delayed by one year, the probability of ﬁnding
a job in the following two years decreases from 60% to 16% for men and from 47% to
13% for women. The unemployment duration does not, however, impose a direct scar
in terms of employment quality: starting wages are not affected by the lagged unemploy-
ment duration and the employment stability increases (signiﬁcantly only for men) with the
lagged unemployment duration. Simulations revealed that the latter effect is quite small
relative to negative duration dependence in the job ﬁnding rate. The duration of the previ-
ous unemployment spell does, nevertheless, impose an indirect scar through forgone work
experience as we ﬁnd evidence of past employment experience increasing future starting
wages (by about 2.5% for each year of experience) and decreasing the future dismissal
rate, especially for women.
25We inferred from these ﬁndings that the cost of prolonged unemployment is not so
much related to depreciation of human capital while unemployed, but rather to forego-
ing the human capital accumulation on-the-job and in particular to the negative signal
that prolonged unemployment conveys to potential recruiters. We argued that the (mild)
positive impact of unemployment duration on the length of the subsequent employment
spell cannot be explained by more selective job acceptance behaviour, but rather by the
fact that the signal conveyed by unemployment duration at recruitment may be reversed
at the moment that the true productivity of the worker is revealed (Jovanovic, 1979). This
explanation holds only, however, if true productivity remains roughly constant over the
period of analysis (as it does here), so that it is captured in the econometric model by the
ﬁxed observed and unobserved individual characteristics.
These ﬁndings lead to the conclusion that curative intervention remains urgent even
if youths are already long-term unemployed. Since human capital depreciation is not so
much an issue for youths, the supply of training does not seem the right response. Our
analysis suggests that offering employment experience as quickly as possible is more
effective. We do not however study which concrete form this policy should take (recruit-
ment subsidies, job referral, compulsory or not, etc.).
The ﬂexible analysis of wages within a multivariate dynamic duration model proposed
in this study was successful in ﬁtting the wage distribution very closely and avoiding
thereby biases induced by strict parametric assumptions on the wage distribution. We
believe that this approach therefore merits to be explored further. Arni et al. (2009) have
already successfully applied this approach to evaluate the impact of active labor market
policies.
Appendix
A.1 Deriving the Likelihood Function
The contribution to the likelihood function of an unemployment spell that ends after t
quarters in employment is the probability that the latent duration Tue ends after  quarters
times the probability that the latent durations Tua is longer than  quarters.31 In the data
duration is measured in discrete time. If we assume that this discrete time process is
generated by some underlying continuous time process in which at most one transition per
quarter can occur and if we assume that this transition occurs at some arbitrary moment
withinthet-thquarter( 2 [t 1;t)), thenthelikelihoodcontributionofanunemployment
31The conditioning on observed and unobserved factors is implicit here. We also ignore the superscript
s for notational convenience.


















If the baseline hazards of the latent durations are assumed to be piecewise constant within
each quarter, then the integral can be solved and the integrated hazard rewritten as a sum
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is the survivor function in unemployment. Reintroducing the set of observed and unob-
served characteristics yields the likelihood contribution (6) in the main text. The con-
tribution to the likelihood function of an unemployment spell that ends in the absorbing
censoring state, a, is given by replacing ue with ua in the numerator of equations (A.2)
and (6). The contribution of employment spells are derived in the same way. The likeli-
hood contribution of a spell that is right censored at the end of the observation period in
December 2002 is given by the corresponding survivor function at that point.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table A.3: Estimation Results of Unemployment and Employment Baseline Hazard
Functions by Gender
Transition ue ua eu ea
Quarters Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Quarters Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Men
2nd -.290 *** .076 -.171 .151 2nd -.269 *** .063 -.219 ** .102
3rd -.318 *** .093 -.043 .167 3rd -.616 *** .082 -.240 ** .111
4th -.502 *** .098 -.153 .136 4th -.601 *** .090 -.277 ** .119
5th -.596 *** .104 .163 .138 5th-6th -1.466 *** .106 -.618 *** .115
6th -.633 *** .113 .090 .144 7th-9th -1.363 *** .102 -.743 *** .116
7th -.674 *** .117 -.019 .148 10th-18th -1.878 *** .118 -1.074 *** .128
8th-9th -.737 *** .116 -.233 .146
10th-12th -.938 *** .127 -.266 .159
13th-16th -1.057 *** .137 -.172 .169
17th-23rd -1.405 *** .155 -.587 *** .193
Women
2nd -.259 *** .075 .111 .124 2nd -.527 *** .058 -.331 *** .105
3rd -.246 *** .094 .438 *** .128 3rd -.987 *** .073 -.148 .105
4th -.420 *** .099 .067 .116 4th -.567 *** .069 -.236 ** .115
5th -.478 *** .106 .369 *** .117 5th-6th -1.368 *** .079 -.467 *** .106
6th -.518 *** .116 .194 .123 7th-9th -1.636 *** .084 -.753 *** .110
7th -.555 *** .120 .240 ** .122 10th-18th -2.276 *** .101 -.697 *** .104
8th-9th -.589 *** .120 .181 .119
10th-12th -.750 *** .133 .182 .124
13th-16th -.874 *** .145 .087 .125
17th-23rd -1.220 *** .164 .084 .130
Notes: * Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level.
Table A.4: Estimation Results of the Wage Baseline
Hazard Function by Gender
Men Women
Wage support segments Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Reference: [w0;w1)
[w1;w3) 2.491 *** .104 2.637 *** .098
[w3;w4) 2.898 *** .115 3.058 *** .104
[w4;w5) 3.304 *** .113 3.424 *** .106
[w5;w6) 3.618 *** .113 3.692 *** .109
[w6;w7) 4.000 *** .101 3.978 *** .099
[w7;w8) 3.992 *** .099 3.975 *** .098
[w8;w9) 4.036 *** .100 4.278 *** .095
[w9;w10) 4.288 *** .104 4.448 *** .101
[w10;w11) 4.176 *** .121 4.528 *** .111
[w11;w12) 4.226 *** .117 4.588 *** .114
[w12;w13) 4.248 *** .114 4.581 *** .112
[w13;w14) 4.635 *** .108 4.813 *** .110
[w14;w15) 4.767 *** .118 5.147 *** .117
[w15;w16) 4.754 *** .139 4.852 *** .155
[w16;w17) 4.251 *** .177 4.855 *** .157
[w17;w18) 4.501 *** .150 4.939 *** .152
[w18;w19) 4.448 *** .165 4.980 *** .161
[w19;w21) 4.632 *** .133 5.227 *** .134
[w21;w22] 4.899 *** .112 5.527 *** .123
Note: *** Signiﬁcant at 1% level.
30A.3 Simulation Algorithms
Simulations with Regard to the Goodness-of-Fit
Left truncation complicates the simulation procedure. Since all sampled individuals have
already been unemployed for three quarters at the start of the observation period, the dis-
tribution of unobserved heterogeneity must be modiﬁed along the lines of the adjustment
of the likelihood function. The distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity conditional
on surviving three quarters in unemployment after school departure can be derived from
Bayes’ theorem. The probability pm
i that individual i is of type m and is therefore as-


















where c M = 3 for men and women. Observe that this distribution depends on the values of
the observed explanatory variables at the sampling date and it is not therefore independent
of the other covariates.
The simulation then proceeds according to the following steps:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming that the estimator is Normally dis-
tributedaroundthepointestimatesusingtheestimatedvariance-covariancematrix.32
2. Assign to each individual the observed explanatory variables at the sampling date
and a vector of unobserved characteristics drawn with the probability as given in
Equation (A.4).
3. Simulate the transition from u to e or a by a sequence of quarterly transition lotter-
ies starting from the 4th quarter (the observation period). These transition lotteries
are based on the empirical counterparts of the probability of leaving state u for k
(k = e;a), conditional on surviving in state u until the end of the previous quarter.
Their form is given by
Liu(t)
Siu(t 1). In this process, the time-varying variables (the lo-
cal unemployment rate, the regional GDP variation, and the quarterly dummies) are
adjusted to their new values at the beginning of each quarter.
4. If a transition to the absorbing state a occurs, the simulation for that individual is
halted. If there is a transition to e, assign values to the local unemployment rate,
the regional GDP variation, and the quarterly dummies according to the quarter of
entry into the sample and to the unemployment duration. On the basis of the empir-
ical distribution of wages corresponding to the theoretical wage hazard function in
Equation (3), simulate the wage on the basis of individual lotteries.
32This allows us to take the parameter uncertainty into account and to build Monte Carlo conﬁdence
intervals.
315. Simulate the transitions from e according to a similar sequence of quarterly lotteries
as described for unemployment in point 3. The time-varying explanatory variables
are adjusted taking into account the quarter of entry in the sample and the duration
of the unemployment spell.
6. Ifatransitionfrometothecensoringstateaoccurs, thesimulationforthatindividual
is halted. In case of a transition from e to u, simulate the duration of the second
unemployment spell and the destination state as in point 3 but starting from the 1st
quarter. The subsequent starting wage and employment spell are simulated as in
points 4 and 5.
7. The simulation procedure is halted once the end of the observation period is reached,
i.e. in December 2002, 17 to 20 quarters after the sampling date.
8. Repeat for each individual points 1 to 7 R = 999 times to obtain R independent
labor market histories for each sampled individual.
Simulations with Regard to the Evaluation Exercises
The simulation to quantify the impact of unemployment duration dependence on the prob-
ability of ﬁnding a job proceeds as follows:
1. Draw a vector of parameter estimates assuming that the estimator is Normally dis-
tributed around the point estimates with a variance-covariance matrix equal to the
estimated one.
2. Assign to each individual the observed explanatory variables at the sampling date
and a vector of unobserved characteristics drawn with the probability as given in
Equation (A.4).33
3. Compute for each individual the unconditional probability of moving from unem-
ployment to employment as in Equation (A.2), 8t = 1;:::;23.
4. To obtain the average probability of ﬁnding a job in q quarters (8q = 1;:::;12) if
youths start looking for a job as soon as they are sampled, compute the cumulative
sum from t = 4 to q + 3 of the unconditional probability at point 3 and average
across the sample. If youths start looking for a job 4 (8) quarters after the sampling
date the cumulative sum is calculated from t = 8 to q + 7 (t = 12 to q + 11).
5. Repeat points 1 to 4 R = 999 times to obtain R independent realizations and com-
pute Monte Carlo conﬁdence intervals.
The simulation to quantify the impact of lagged unemployment duration on employ-
ment stability proceeds ﬁrst as in point 1 and 2 of the preceding simulation. Subsequently,
33In order to isolate the effect of the unemployment duration dependence from the effect induced by
changes in the time-varying covariates, the time-varying covariates are ﬁxed at their time average over the
observation period.
323. Simulate for each sampled individual the ﬁrst starting wage and the duration of the
ﬁrst employment spell as described in the simulation algorithm with regard to the
goodness-of-ﬁt and by ﬁxing the lagged unemployment duration to 3 quarters, 7
quarters, and 11 quarters.
4. For each of the three counterfactuals, compute the Kaplan-Meier estimates of the
employment survivor function.
5. Repeat points 1 to 4 R = 999 times to obtain R independent realizations and com-
pute Monte Carlo conﬁdence intervals.
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